Agenda
March 26th 2015, 11:30 o'clock
Synopsis Stenographic Minutes
Chairperson: Prof. Dr. Patrick Sensburg, MdB
Deputy chairperson: Susanne Mittag
Topic of agenda
Hearing of witnesses
Klaus Landefeld, advisory board DE-CIX Management GmbH (evidence conclusion Z-15)
Hans de With, former chairman of the G-10-Commission (evidence conclusion Z-74)
WikiLeaks Synopsis
The first witness testifies about the Internet node DE-CIX in Frankfurt. The second witness is questioned about the tasks and responsibilities of the G-10-commission. Both witnesses express criticism about the G-10 law and call for legal revisions.
Proceedings
The evidence conclusion Z-15 dates to May 18th, 2014 and the evidence conclusion Z-74 dates to January 15th, 2015. This meeting brings the evidence to the inquiry federal print matter 18/843 by hearing Mr. Klaus Landefeld and Mr. Hans de With as witnesses. First both witnesses are heard one by one in public. Afterwards the non-public hearings take place.
The first witness is asked about the functioning of the Internet node DE-CIX as well as matters concerning DE-CIX related to “Eikonal” and since the Snowden revelations. It becomes obvious that the realisation of G-10-ordinances is imprecisely regulated. In particular, he states that a complete separation of German traffic from foreign country telecommunication traffic is not possible. In the last part his hearing also deals with meetings of the German Chancellery with Internet companies. Here obviously communication bans have been exerted. The second witness is questioned on tasks and responsibilities of the G-10-commission. He also utters his criticism about the G-10 law and calls for revisions. Major groups of subjects below are linked with selected passages in the transcript and several quotes can be read translated into English.
Hearing of Klaus Landefeld
Personal details: Klaus Landefeld is 46 years old and an entrepreneur and executive director by profession. He has studied computing and has worked as an entrepreneur in this field since he was 16 years old. Since 1990 he has offered commercial services together with a large network provider, which he founded himself (worldwide services in 17 countries). He participated in the establishment of several Internet nodes, for example the build-up of DE-CIX (German Internet exchange node in Frankfurt), run by the eco-association of the German Internet industry, where he is dean.
Legal advisor: lawyer Henning Lesch
The witness briefly describes his career and explains that the question, “How do prosecution authorities or intelligence agencies adhere to surveillance of the Internet?“ has been present since the 1990's. Since 2000 and specifically since 9/11 worldwide discussions about Internet surveillance (also together with the NSA) have been getting more concrete: How can data be accessed? How can this function? He also stressed that these considerations back then in Germany have taken place very cautiously. It was only in 2004, 2005, and with respect to the DE-CIX only in 2008, when first approaches by intelligence agencies took place, accompanied by the question of what the technical realisation could look like at all.
An Internet node facilitates the exchange of data between the numerous different Internet service providers for their end-customers. The witness reports that pressure has been exerted through intervention of the Chancellery. He reports from various meetings with governmental representatives and from the instruction to not answer specific questions about surveillance according to G-10 (2013). Moreover, he complains that there is no agreed clear procedure for G-10, nor for the realisation of the 20%-regulation.
Questions for Klaus Landefeld
Particularly intensively discussed groups of subjects (note: f / ff indicate this page and the next / this page and the following pages; the linked pages are not a complete list):
- Career of the witness / company structures of the DE-CIX Management GmbH: 9f, 21f, 39f, 52
- Licenses / legal bases / requirements for secrecy / transparency reports / BSI-certificates: 10, 20f, 40f, 44ff
- Technical functioning DE-CIX / exchanged amounts of data / switch/port / used hardware / meta data traffics: 10ff, 12f, 14-20, 50f, 64f, 70f, 73, 77f
- Communication with and access by foreign intelligence agencies / legal conditions for foreign customers / registration of (customers of) transit providers / automatised surveillance in the USA: 14, 21, 22f, 29, 43, 55ff, 68f, 72, 77, 88
- Infrastructure and cables of telecommunication providers: 14ff, 42
- Post-Snowden activities at DE-CIX / revisions G-10 / Post-Snowden crisis meetings / communication bans: 18f, 57f, 65-68, 89-102
- Potential compromising at DE-CIX / access to exchange points / cyber attacks / industry espionage: 22, 24ff, 28, 50f, 68f, 77-81, 84-88
- Separation of German and foreign traffics / what happens in case of G-10-ordinance? / indeterminateness in G-10-regulation / realisation of legal regulations / legal legitimacy of G-10-ordinances: 26-29, 29-36, 36-39, 40ff, 46f, 51-54, 61ff, 69, 73-77, 96
- Segment- and cable-selection: 27f, 37f, 48f, 62, 83, 96
- 20%-regulation / capacity/utilisation / filtering systems: 29ff, 47f, 61ff, 66ff, 70f, 73
- Contact with the BND / communication with the Chancellery / initiating meetings and crisis meetings: 36ff, 58ff, 81, 88-102
- Forwarding of data in “Eikonal“/“Glotaic“ / sham firms for access to data / termination of “Eikonal“: 39, 49ff, 50f, 59-63, 74
- End-to-end-encryption: 43, 54
- Reference to certain press articles: 62
- Reference to specific documents: 71, 100
Selected quotes:
Landefeld: “When you connect with a [telecommunications]-line with this node, then you have access to all others. That means - in the case of DE-CIX it is the [...] largest Internet node of the world - that you meanwhile can reach circa 650 other providers, when you are connected there.“
Sensburg: “What would you recommend to somebody who illegally wants to channel off larger amounts of data - how should he do it?
(Laughter) […]
Landefeld: It probably is the easiest to organise some kind of data exchange with an intelligence service that can do it legally. […]
Sensburg: Okay. So all technical tricks, access to routers, any kind of cables, is very complex. But all that is theoretically conceivable with concerted effort. […]
Landefeld: Exactly, yes.“
Renner: “[I] am interested, to what extent an actual sharp separation, between so-called German and foreign communication traffic can be realised […].
Landefeld: First of all about sharpness of separation: You can always only achieve a relatively sharp separation here. You can try to conduct that properly or say: I mainly have German IP addresses or mainly German e-mail-addresses or the like. - But when it comes to a separation sharpness of hundred percent, you will not achieve that in Internet and IP traffic.“
Flisek: “If I understood you correctly, you have said that you are missing standards.
Landefeld: Yes. […] for regular TKÜ[telecommunication surveillance]-measures [...] in the prosecution area […] there are entirely clear technical standards […]: That is documented down to the last bit, how that functions, what happens there, what must be channeled out, what must not be channeled out [...]. In the area of G-10 there is - nothing. […] there are no technical standards in this area, that somehow define […] how to deal with these things, with these traffics.“
Ströbele: “So, the BND has been at your company and has said: “We want all“, and then you have said: “But that doesn't work with such a simple ordinance, we want an ordinance that must also be justified, line by line“ And then you were insecure and contacted your colleague Mr. Stadler back then – he was both in the PKG and in the G-10 commission – and he said, there he cannot help you either, right?
Landefeld: Similar. He cannot do much, as long as he doesn't have at hand anything concrete.
Ströbele: [...] And then you have been summoned -
Landefeld: Exactly.
Ströbele: - to the Chancellery?“
About the conversation on August 9th, 2013 with the Chancellery
Landefeld: “So, in August […] 09.08. […] There has been an official questionnaire of the Federal Network Agency, that asked: “What happens with that data, and what do you channel off?“, etc. That included such witty questions like: […] So, question three: Do you channel off data to foreign agencies? Question four: Are you allowed to answer question three honestly? [...]
Sensburg: I only got shocked, that is, was forbidden to speak […].
Landefeld: [...] Well, those communication bans haven't been approached that explicitly. Right at the beginning, when entering the room [...] is has been said: “The points 17 to 19 must not be spoken about“, one had gotten the instruction that these questions are not to be raised.“
Von Notz: “And did the Chancellery explain legal reasons at this meeting on February 27th, 2009 […] or did they declare things more hierarchically?
Landefeld: That is an outstanding question. “Both“ is the right answer. So, one of them with the required authority stated that all of that is all right and that we are obliged to execute these measures accordingly.“
Questions from Prof. Dr. Patrick Sensburg
Questions from the parliamentary groups
DIE LINKE
SPD
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
CDU/CSU
Second round of questions
DIE LINKE
CDU/CSU
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
SPD
Third round of questions and further rounds
DIE LINKE
CDU/CSU
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
SPD
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
Hearing of Dr. Hans de With
Personal details: Hans de With is 82 years old and is now a lawyer. From 1999 to January 2014 he was the chairman of the G-10 Commission.
No legal advisor.
Summary Input Dr. Hans de With
The witness outlines the tasks of the G-10 commission: the G-10 commission has to decide about the execution of measures referring to individuals, strategic control – a dragnet investigation, that assigns passwords – as well as measures that are taken when life and limb are risked abroad.
A fourth possibility of control in the question of the so-called “open sky” does not exist according to G-10-law. “Open sky” means that there are restriction measures on the BND abroad, either in a foreign state from one point to another, or from one foreign country to another foreign country. It can be claimed that in this case there is no independent entity that takes over a final check at implementation. The witness claims new regulations for that. He also stresses that the statements about “Eikonal” made by the press (Süddeutsche Zeitung, middle of 2014) are not true.
Questions for Dr. Hans de With
Particularly intensively discussed groups of subjects (note: f / ff indicate this page and the next / this page and the following pages; the linked pages are not a complete list):
- Tasks of the witness in the G-10 commission / tasks of the G-10 commission / control of the intelligence agencies by the G-10 commission / selection of segments: 106, 108f, 115f, 117f, 120, 122, 129
- Control gaps / control responsibilities of the G-10 commission / discussions within the G-10 commission / legitimacy of G-10 measures / G-10 and routine traffics / 20%-regulation: 107ff, 111-118, 121, 123-126, 130
- Recommendations for revising the G-10 law. 108ff, 117ff, 129
- “Eikonal“: legal concerns / problems with DAFIS/filtering / access to data by the NSA: 108-112, 120, 122, 126ff, 130f
- Reference to certain press articles: 106, 108, 111, 120
Selected quotes:
About Eikonal:
Warken: “There has been a test that showed that only 95% have been filtered out. What consequence in terms of a legal legitimacy of such a reconnaissance measure would that have from your point of view?
De With: If that is true, […] then it would have had to be told to the G-10 commission. […] The consequence would have been, that the commission would have visited Frankfurt […] then assessed: Is it a case of “open sky” or a strategic restriction measure according to G-10-law? - If it would have been the latter, then we would have raised the alarm, I guess.“
About “Eikonal“, “Granat“ or “Glotaic“:
Hahn: “If you had known or if somebody had told you that in such a project of telecommunication reconnaissance all data is also forwarded elsewhere, more concretely to the American intelligence agency, and in total, just as it came in, would you have agreed to such an ordinance in the G-10 commission?
De With: No, then we would have raised the alarm. That I assume. But that is my assumption.“
Flisek: “Do you believe that the prevailing law […] provides appropriate instruments for controlling the “open sky”? […] Because from what you have quoted, […] are no responsibility norms for an intervention for example, and therefore no suitable legal basis to justify an intervention into article 10. Do I interpret you correctly here?
De With: In my view it is not possible. Let me phrase it very cautiously: I cannot utter a final opinion about that, how exactly that would have to be regulated legally, but I have the very highest doubts whether the prevailing legal regulations, namely the BND-law and G-10, cover that sufficiently.“
Questions from the parliamentary groups
CDU/CSU
DIE LINKE
SPD
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
Second round of questions and further rounds
CDU/CSU
DIE LINKE
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
DIE LINKE
SPD
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN